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Abstract
To prevent possible abuse of market power in the future an an-
titrust agency can force merging ¯rms to divest some of their assets.
The divested assets can be sold through an auction either to exist-
ing competitors or a new entrant. An analysis of a Cournot market
with ¯xed capital (assets) is conducted. Divesture of assets extends
the range of parameters when a merger satis¯es consumer surplus
standard and should be approved. The rationalization of production
between the merging ¯rms and the viability of a new entrant play
a crucial role in determining whether to approve a merger. If the
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and merging ¯rms.
Keywords: merger regulation, structural remedies, e±ciency, auction
JEL classi¯cation: D43, K21, L51
¤I am thankful to Eric van Damme, Avner Shaked, Jan Boone, Dirk Engelmann, Valter
Sorana, and Dmitry Ryvkin for valuable discussions and suggestions.
yCenter for Economic Research and Graduate Education: andrei.medvedev@cerge-ei.cz
zTilburg Law and Economics Center, Tilburg University: a.medvedev@uvt.nl
11 Introduction
There is an extensive literature on mergers for di®erent market structures
and types of competition1. It has been shown that if there are no cost
reductions due to a merger, ¯rms ¯nd it pro¯table to exercise their market
power through a price increase, which decreases consumer surplus.
At the same time an antitrust agency can choose between behavioral and
structural remedies to restore e®ective competition in relevant markets2. Be-
havioral remedies set constraints on the merged ¯rms' future behavior such as
engagements by the merging parties not to abuse certain assets, compulsory
licensing, access to intellectual property. However, in the case of behavioral
remedies the prime di±culty is in overseeing the implementation of the reme-
dies at the post-merger phase. Structural remedies modify the allocation of
property rights and create new ¯rms through entire or partial divesture of
assets. In the EU the competition agency prefers to use structural remedies,
because it is easy to implement and once implemented there is no need to
monitor behavior of merging ¯rms afterwards3.
In this paper I analyze structural remedies in merger regulation. Although
there are discussions by antitrust practitioners, academics, and lawyers, to
my knowledge the idea of structural remedies as a way to protect consumers
is not formally analyzed in the literature. The model presented in this paper
captures and allows a theoretical analysis of all main issues that are at stake
when the agency makes a merger approval decision.
This paper is an extension of Shapiro and Farrell (1990), Perry and Porter
(1985), McAfee and Williams (1992) models. Those papers conduct an equi-
librium analysis of a Cournot market before and after a merger with a focus
1Salant et al. (1983), Perry and Porter (1985), Deneckere and Davidson (1985), Zang
and Kamien (1990), Shapiro and Farrell (1990), Horn and Persson (2001).
2"The vast majority of cases raising competition concerns were solved through viable
remedies o®ered by the notifying parties in due time." Monti M., the EU Competition
Commissioner, Paris, January 2002.
3See Monti (2002), Motta et al. (2002), Motta (2004)
2on pro¯tability and welfare changes. A common feature in those models is
the existence of a ¯xed capital (assets) in an industry. The amount of ¯xed
capital in possession of a ¯rm determines ¯rms' production costs. In this
paper I modify their analysis by allowing partial divesture of assets.
In order to prevent possible abuse of market power in the future the agency
can force merging ¯rms to divest some of their assets4. The divested assets
can be sold either to existing competitors or stimulate a new entrant into
the market by selling him the divested assets. One of the viable mechanisms
to sell divested assets is an auction. In the paper we analyze certain auction
outcomes and possible ways to enhance consumer and total welfare. Accord-
ing to the EU merger regulation5 merging ¯rms suggest a purchaser, which
must be approved by the agency. Therefore, the agency has veto power over
the choice of a purchaser of divested assets.
It is assumed that an antitrust agency applies a consumer surplus standard;
it wants to approve mergers that decrease prices, while rejecting the ones
that increase prices6. However, mergers could lead to signi¯cant synergies
(e±ciencies). If synergies between merging ¯rms are substantial, then price
might decrease after a merger, i.e. cost reduction outweighs market power
e®ect7. This issue plays an important role in merger regulation after both the
EU and US agencies allowed for an e±ciency defense in merger approvals.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 I describe the basic
model. Then I analyze a symmetric cost structure case, and proceed with a
non-symmetric case. Then results are discussed, followed by a conclusion.
4We can think about landing slots at airports that airlines possess, licences, radio or
mobile phone frequencies, electricity generation facilities, etc. The agency can ask to divest
certain number of them as a structural remedy.
5The EU Merger Regulation and Competition Commission "Best practice guidelines
for divesture commitments" published on
http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/mergers/legislation.
6For a discussion about consumer vs. total surplus approaches in merger regulation, see
Motta (2004), Neven and Roller (2000), Shapiro and Farrell (2001), Besanko and Spulder
(1993).
7See Williamson (1968), Werden (1996), Shapiro and Farrell (1990), Roller et al. (2000),
Besanko and Spulder (1993).
32 Model
Let us consider market inverse demand function P = a ¡ bX, where the
total output X =
Pn
i=1 xi and xi is ¯rm's i output. Each ¯rm maximizes
its pro¯t: maxxi(a ¡ bX)xi ¡ C(xi;si), where si is ¯rm's i assets. The
idea of the ¯xed capital s in the industry is captured through a form of the
cost function, C(xi;si) =
di
sixi, the more capital a ¯rm possesses, the lower
marginal costs of production. Parameter di describes ¯rm's i production
technology. Therefore, the market is characterized by constant marginal
costs of production Cxi =
di
si. This is a simpli¯ed form of Perry and Porter
(1985), McAfee and Williams (1992) cost function C(x;s) = sg + dx + e
2sx2
and, consequently, marginal costs Cx = d + e
sx and Shapiro and Farrell
(1990) cost function C(x;s) = wx
1
bs¡ a





b, where s is amount of ¯xed capital, and a;b;e;d;g;w are
constants. The constant marginal costs function allows to capture the main
feature of their functions, the inverse relation between assets and marginal
costs, but it simpli¯es derivations signi¯cantly. Although many results in
the paper would be valid for any convex cost function with respect to a ¯xed
capital (Cs < 0; Css > 0).
The equilibrium for a Cournot type of competition with constant marginal
costs is the following. Each ¯rm maximizes its pro¯t:
maxxi(a¡bX)xi ¡
di
sixi for i = 1;:::;n. There is a restriction on parameters:
a¡
di
si > 0. A ¯rm with too little capital, that a¡
di
si < 0, would always prefer
not to produce. Given demand and costs functions, the equilibrium output
and price before the merger are derived from the system of n ¯rst-order












sj) is the output by the i-th ¯rm8 and
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First, we derive a pre-merger equilibrium and then compare it with cases
when there is no agency's intervention, when the agency can force dives-
ture and the divested assets go either to an existing competitor or to a new
entrant. The objective of the agency is to protect consumers from a price
increase due to the merger. Having veto power over a purchaser of the di-
vested assets, the agency approves a merger only if the price after the merger
will not increase.
Consider ¯rst a symmetric case with n=3, i.e. each ¯rm possesses an equal
amount of ¯xed capital s, i.e. s1 = s2 = s3 = s, and the same production
technology, i.e. d1 = d2 = d3 = d, to get a feeling how the system behaves.
3.1 Pre-merger case







s) and, consequently, the equilibrium price before the
merger is P Before = 1
4(a + 3d
s).





3.2 Merger to duopoly without agency's intervention
When any two ¯rms in the market merge the number of ¯rms decreases and
the market becomes more concentrated. However, the merged ¯rm becomes
twice bigger than its competitor and possesses (2s) assets, which decreases
its marginal costs of production. The equilibrium output and price after the
merger is derived from the system of two FOCs for the merged ¯rm (M) and
the ¯rm-outsider (o):
5(
a ¡ 2bxM ¡ bxo = d
2s























Remark 1: Price after the merger will not increase, P A · P B, if a
3 · d
s.




s) = P B , a
3 · d
s
Marginal costs of production of the merged ¯rm could decrease substantially
because the ¯rm possesses more ¯xed capital. Lower marginal costs for the
merged ¯rm could outweigh market power e®ect and be su±cient not to
increase market price. This result copies the one, which was shown by Shapiro
and Farrell (1990)9.
Pro¯t of the merged ¯rm is ¦M = 1












The merger is possible only if it is pro¯table for the merging ¯rms itself, i.e.
if a joint pro¯t after the merger is higher than the sum of pro¯ts before the
merger when they are separate ¯rms. However, this condition usually holds
for a wide range of parameters10.
3.3 Merger to duopoly with divesture to an existing
competitor
The agency can use structural remedies to 'correct' new market situation
and keep prices at least unchanged after the merger. The agency can ask
the merged ¯rm to divest some of obtained assets. A volume of divested
9Shapiro and Farrell (1990) showed that a merger raises price if and only if a markup
of the would-be merging ¯rms is less than the sum of the pre-merger markups at its
constituent ¯rms, where a merged ¯rm produces just as much as its constituent ¯rms





















6assets is denoted by ¢ with ¢ 2 [0;sj], where sj is amount of ¯xed assets
which belongs to the acquired ¯rm. There is an upper limit on the amount
the agency can ask the merged ¯rm to divest because otherwise the merger
makes no sense: asking more the agency would leave the acquiring ¯rm
with less assets than before the merger. Therefore, if two ¯rms merge then
they control (2s) assets. After the agency asks them to divest (¢) assets,
then (2s ¡ ¢) assets remain in their possession. If divested assets go to an
existing competitor, then the outsider to the merger possesses (s+¢) assets.
Equilibrium output and price are derived from the system of two FOCs for
the merged ¯rm (M) and the ¯rm-outsider(o):
(
a ¡ 2bxM ¡ bxo = d
2s¡¢





















Pro¯t of the merged ¯rm is ¦A1
M = 1
9b[a ¡ 2 d
2s¡¢ + d





2s¡¢]2. The merging ¯rms will proceed with
the merger only if it is pro¯table for them: ¦A1
M > ¦B
1 +¦B
2 . However, like in
the previous section, it is possible to show that this pro¯tability constraint
is not binding for parameters when the price not increases after the merger.
If we compare this situation with divesture with the one without (i.e. when
the agency doesn't intervene), then the following proposition holds.
Proposition 1: Given pre-merger symmetric cost structure (s1 = s2 = s3
and d1 = d2 = d3), any divesture ¢ 2 (0;s) leads to lower prices than without
it.









2s , 2s2 · (2s ¡ ¢)(s + ¢), because ¢(s ¡ ¢) ¸ 0.
The divesture leads to more symmetric market. From the proposition above
it is seen that no matter how large the decrease in marginal costs due to
more ¯xed capital for the merged ¯rm it is always better to divest some
7assets and restore the symmetry: take assets from the bigger ¯rm and give it
to the smaller one. This results come from the convexity of the cost function,
(Cx = d
s): marginal costs are inversely related to the amount of ¯xed capital
a ¯rm possesses. Given ¯rms' identical cost structure and a Cournot type
of competition the maximum output and the lowest price are achieved when
all ¯rms at the market possess equal amount of ¯xed capital, i.e. in case of
duopoly the best result is achieved when (s
2) assets are divested and both
¯rms possess (3
2s).
Therefore we can distinguish three e®ects that a®ect equilibrium price in the
market: number of players, marginal costs, and symmetry of the market11.
Number of players in the market and degree of symmetry negatively e®ects
the price, while marginal costs positively e®ect the price.
From Section 3.2 we know that if a
3 · d
s, then we do not need any divesture
to make prices not to increase, i.e. ¢ = 0. Now let's check if a
3 > d
s, then
how many assets the agency should ask the merging ¯rms to divest in order







¡¢2 + s¢ + 2s2 3d¡as
9d¡as ¸ 0












The expression under the square root should be positive but less than one,
0 · 33d¡9as
9d¡as · 1, to make divesture less than s assets (otherwise the agency
asks to divest more than the acquiring ¯rm obtained from the merger). If
(9d ¡ as) < 0, then (3d ¡ as) < 0 and (33d ¡ 9as) < 0 as well, and it would
be impossible to have the square root expression to be less than 1. Given
(9d ¡ as) > 0, the price will stay unchanged after the merger if :
11One of the measurements of symmetry of the market is the Her¯ndahl-Hirschman
















and the following inequalities hold 0 · 33d¡9as




There are two solutions to the quadratic equation, but the one with least
divesture, ¢
Req
1 , should be a focus of the analysis. Both solutions lead to the
same result (keep the price unchanged) and the agency should choose the
one with minimum possible intervention into the market.
The results show that a possibility of divesture of assets from the merging
¯rms extends the range of parameters to satisfy consumer surplus standard
from a
3 · d
s (case of a merger without divesture) to 9a
33 · d




3 there is such divesture ¢ between 0 and s
2 that would
keep the price after the merger unchanged. If 9
33a = d
s, then ¢Req = s
2, i.e.
the merged ¯rm should divest exactly half of what it obtained through the
merger and, therefore, two ¯rms in the market would possess equal amount
of ¯xed capital (the fact that we discussed above).
Since the agency's prime objective is to protect consumers from unjust price
increases after the merger due to increased market power and the agency
doesn't pay attention to ¯rms' pro¯ts (or absence of it), the agency should
choose such divesture that keeps price unchanged rather than the one that
minimizes price12.
3.3.1 E±ciencies
At the same time there could be e±ciency gains due to merger speci¯c syn-
ergies between merging ¯rms' assets. In our setting it is equivalent to the
decrease in parameter d (from d to ®d, where ® 2 [0;1]) for the merged ¯rm.
If divested assets (¢) go to a competitor, then the merged ¯rm possesses
(2s ¡ ¢), while the competitor has (s + ¢) assets. At the same time it is
assumed that the merging ¯rms are able to achieve e±ciencies even if some
12The merger with required divesture should be pro¯table for the merging ¯rms as we
discussed before.
9of its combined assets are divested. Equilibrium output and price are derived
from the system of two FOCs for the merged ¯rm (M) and the outsider (o):
(
a ¡ 2bxM ¡ bxo = ®d
2s¡¢





















Proposition 2: Price after the merger will not increase, P A1(®) · P B,





Function ¢(®) could be plotted for given values of parameters a and d (see
Graph 1). The line captures a trade-o® between e±ciency gains due to the
merger and divested assets the agency asks the merged ¯rm to sell-o® to the
competitor in order to keep prices unchanged after the merger13. This trade-
o® plays an important role in merger regulation after both the EU and USA
agencies recently allowed for the e±ciency defense in merger approvals. It
illustrates that the amount of divested assets depends on veri¯ed e±ciencies
merging ¯rms are able to bring in front of the agency.
The inclusion of exogenously given "synergy parameter" ® implies that a cost
function is not convex in s anymore. It allows for a shift in marginal costs
function. Although the problem with such types of changes in parameters is
that they are exogenously given.
3.4 Merger with divesture to a new entrant
The agency can enforce divesture of (¢) assets to a new entrant into the
market. Therefore, the merging ¯rms possess (2s¡¢) assets, old competitor
has (s) assets, while their new competitor has (¢) assets. Equilibrium output
13As we discussed above in a Cournot type of competition the maximum output and
the lowest price are achieved when market structure is symmetric, i.e. ¯rms have equal
marginal costs. In the presence of e±ciencies ® it means that this best outcome is achieved
when ®d
2s¡¢ = d
s+¢ , ¢ = s2¡®
1+®
10and price are derived from the system of three FOCs for the merging ¯rms




a ¡ 2bxM ¡ bxo ¡ bxN = d
2s¡¢
a ¡ 2bxo ¡ bxM ¡ bxN = d
s
































Proposition 3: If the pre-merger market is characterized by symmetric
cost structure (s1 = s2 = s3 and d1 = d2 = d3 = d) and a new entrant
possesses the same technology as all other ¯rms (dN = d), then there is
no such divesture ¢ to a new entrant that would decrease price after the
merger.
Proof: Price after the merger with a divesture to a new entrant, P A2, is
always greater than price before the merger, P B:










s , s2 ¸ (2s ¡ ¢)¢ , (s ¡ ¢)2 ¸ 0.
The price will never decrease due to the form of the marginal costs function
(d
s). Under the symmetric cost structure and a Cournot type of competition
the maximum output and lowest price are achieved when all ¯rms possess
equal amount of ¯xed capital (which is the case for the pre-merger situation).
After the merger the number of players stays the same (one ¯rm is eliminated
through the merger but a new one is formed) but cost structure becomes non-
symmetric14.
Remark 2: It is possible to show that this proposition is valid for any
convex cost function with respect to ¯xed capital (Cs < 0; Css > 0).
From Sections 3.3 and 3.4 it is seen that if the pre-merger market is char-
acterized by symmetric cost structure, then the agency would never approve
14There is an increase in market concentration. The market becomes less symmetric and
the Her¯ndahl index goes up: the merged ¯rm is bigger than Firm 1 before the merger
(2s ¡ ¢ > s) and a new entrant is smaller than Firm 2 (¢ < s).
11a merger with a divesture of assets to a new entrant. Therefore, there is
no need to auction the divested assets because an existing competitor is the
only potential purchaser of the assets that could be approved by the agency.
However, if a market is characterized by a non-symmetric cost structure the
auction can lead to di®erent outcomes.
4 Non-symmetric case
First let's consider a three-¯rm industry with the identical technology pa-
rameters for the marginal costs function d = d1 = d2 = d3 but not equal
amount of ¯xed capital s1; s2; s3, i.e. each ¯rm faces identical marginal
costs function but possesses di®erent amount of ¯xed capital.
Proposition 4: If ¯rms in the market di®ers only in amount of ¯xed capital
they possess then a merger between any two ¯rms with divesture to a new
entrant leads to a price increase.
Proof: This proposition follows from the convexity of the costs function.
Assume the price after the merger is lower than before the merger:

















¢ , s1s2 < (s1+s2)¢¡¢2
Inequality holds if ¢ 2 (s2;s1) assuming s2 < s1, which requires to divest
more than was acquired. It is impossible.
Remark 3: It is possible to show that this proposition is valid for any
convex cost function with respect to ¯xed capital.
Conclusion: Similarly to the symmetric case the agency will never approve
divesture of assets to a new entrant. For certain values of parameters it can
approve a sale of the divested assets to the existing competitor, or approve
the merger without any divesture, or reject the merger at all. Therefore,
this non-symmetric case does not provide us with any new insights on the
divesture problem.
12Consider a three-¯rm industry with equal amount of assets across ¯rms
s1 = s2 = s3 = s but with di®erent technology parameters d1; d2; d3. Let's
assume that ¯rm 1 and 2 are merging and the merged ¯rm would produce at
marginal costs which are the lowest among the two merging ¯rms15. Without
loss of generality we can assume that d1 < d2.
Then there are 2 cases:
a) A merger between two ¯rms with divesture to the existing competitor.
Hence, the equilibrium price in the non-symmetric case with the divesture




b) A merger between two ¯rms with divesture to a new entrant. The marginal
costs of production for a new entrant are characterized by a parameter dN.
This parameter determines viability of a new entrant, which is a prime con-
cern for the EU Competition Commission while deciding on the divesture of
assets16. Hence, the equilibrium price in the non-symmetric case with the






In merger approval decisions the agency and the merging ¯rms negotiate
required amount of divested assets ¢ and then can decide to auction it.
In principle an auction seems a viable mechanism to sell divested assets
and often parties in interest opt for it17. At the auction either an existing
competitor or a new entrant purchases the divested assets. A winner of the
auction determines a market structure and, consequently, prices. The agency
approves a purchaser only if the price will not increase. At the same time
a merger and, consequently, a divesture are possible only if the merger is
bene¯cial for the merging ¯rms itself (¯rm 1 and 2), i.e. if the merging
¯rms expect higher joint pro¯t after the merger than the sum of pro¯ts
before the merger when they are separate ¯rms: ¦
Before





Merged(2s¡¢). It is worth noticing that divesture is a plausible instrument
only if exogenous parameters are such that without any agency's intervention
15In the literature it is known as a rationalization of production, i.e. a shift of output
to the facility with lower marginal cost (see Shapiro and Farrell 1990).
16Exogenous parameters should satisfy a condition: xN = 1
4b(a ¡ 3dN
¢ + 1
2¡¢ + d3) > 0
17An alternative to the auction is a direct sale of assets.
13price will increase after the merger (like in the Remark 1, Section 3.2), i.e.
only if P Before < P After(without divesture).18
The analysis proceeds in the following way. First, given exogenous parame-
ters and values of ¢ between 0 and s we check who has a higher expected
pro¯t from the purchase of the divested assets: an existing competitor or a
new entrant. Then, given the amount of divested assets and the winner at
the auction we check whether the merger is pro¯table for the merging ¯rms.
Finally, we answer a question what would happened to the price. The agency
approves the divesture only if it will not increase the price.
In Section 4.1-4.3 we formally introduce the conditions mentioned above and
then (Section 4.4) proceed with the analysis of possible auction outcomes.
4.1 Incentives for an existing competitor and a new en-
trant to purchase the divested assets
The existing competitor (¯rm 3) compares pro¯ts when it purchases divested
assets (¢) and then operates in duopoly market with the situation when it
stays away from the purchase while a new entrant buys the assets. Pro¯t
of the existing competitor if it purchases divested assets and operates in





2s¡¢]2, while pro¯t of the existing








¢ ]2. If a new entrant purchases










3 > ¦N holds, then the existing competitor
bids a higher price than a new entrant, because its expected pro¯t is higher.
Here and later on in the paper without loss of generality we can assume that
s = 1 and d1 = 1 to simplify the further calculations. With this the above
condition becomes:
16
9 [a ¡ 2 d3
1+¢ + 1
2¡¢]2 ¡ [a ¡ 3d3 + 1
2¡¢ +
dN









s ] < 1
3[a + d1
2s + d3
s ] = PAfter(without divesture).
14There are 4 exogenous parameters in the model (a; d2; d3; dN), therefore it
is di±cult to derive explicitly conditions for the inequality to hold. However,
given certain values of exogenous parameters, it is seen (Graph 0) that by
changing values of ¢ the divested assets could be purchased either by a new
entrant or by the existing competitor.
4.2 Incentives for the merging ¯rms
The merging ¯rms (¯rm 1 and 2) proceed with the merger if expected joint
pro¯t after the merger is higher than the sum of pro¯ts before the merger
when they are separate ¯rms: ¦
Before
1 (s) + ¦
Before
2 (s) < ¦
After
Merger(2s ¡ ¢).
Depending on who wins the auction the condition above becomes:
a) if the existing competitor purchases the assets (given s = 1 and d1 = 1)
1
16b[a ¡ 3 + d2 + d3]2 + 1
16b[a + 1 ¡ 3d2 + d3]2 < 1
9b[a ¡ 2 1
2¡¢ + d3
1+¢]2
b) if a new entrant purchases the assets
1
16b[a ¡ 3 + d2 + d3]2 + 1
16b[a + 1 ¡ 3d2 + d3]2 < 1




4.3 Price change after a divesture
a) If the divested assets go to the existing competitor, then the price will not
increase after the merger if




s ] ¸ 1
3[a + d1
2s¡¢ + d3
s+¢] = P EC
Given the assumptions s = 1 and d1 = 1, we obtain the following inequality:
3(1 + d2 + d3) ¸ a + 4 1
2¡¢ + 4 d3
1+¢
b) If the divested assets go to a new entrant then the price will not increase
after the merger if









¢ ] = P NE




154.4 Possible divesture auction outcomes
In this section we investigate some outcomes of the auction of divested assets
and possible ways to enhance consumer welfare. It is di±cult to solve ana-
lytically the system of all inequalities above because there are 6 exogenous
parameters a; d1; d2; d3; dN; s. We know that d1 < d2 and without loss of









sj) > 0 must hold. However, we can conduct a numerical
analysis and look at some possible outcomes of structural remedies.
The crucial parameters in the model are ¯rms' marginal costs. The table be-
low re°ects technology parameter di of marginal costs of each ¯rm relatively
to all others. In columns there is a ranking of two merging ¯rms parameters
(d1 and d2) relatively to the outsider to the merger (d3). In rows there is a
ranking of a new entrant's parameter (dN) relatively to the three pre-merger
¯rms19.
Merging ¯rms
d1 and d2 wrt d3
New entrant dN Two lowest Two highest Lowest and Highest
Lowest Case 1 Case 2 Case 3
b/w ¯rst and second Case 4 Case 5 Case 6
b/w second and third Case 7 Case 8 Case 9
Highest Case 10 Case 11 Case 12
A numerical analysis is conducted by using MATLAB software (see a sam-
ple of the code in the Appendix). Without loss of generality it is assumed
that a = 4 (a is a parameter of the inverse demand function). We check
for di®erent types of equilibria for ¢ 2 (0;1) (grid is 100) and parameters
d2;d3;dN 2 (0;4) (grid is 100). Given inequalities in sections 4.1-4.3 and
conditions in footnotes 8 and 17, the following results are obtained.
19There are 4 parameters (d1;d2;d3;dN) and (4!) = 24 combinations when the order
matters. Assuming d1 < d2 there are only 12 possible cases left.





d3) > 0 does not hold, i.e. a new entrant cannot have a positive output level.
The viability of a new entrant that is captured by the ratio
dN
¢ is crucial for
the ¯rm's competitiveness. It is seen that the higher d3, marginal costs of
the existing competitor, and the more e±cient a new entrant relatively to
the merging ¯rms, which e±ciency is normalized to one, the more likely the
condition to hold. If the condition does not hold, then the existing competitor
would always win the auction whenever it is pro¯table for him20 and for the
merging ¯rms (see section 4.2), otherwise the merger would not happened.
Depending on the exogenous parameters the price will increase or decrease,
and hence the merger be rejected or approved by the agency, respectively.
There are parameters when a new entrant wins the auction, the price de-
creases, and it is pro¯table for the merging ¯rms to proceed with the merger
and divesture. From the numerical analysis we can say that such situation
can emerge in Cases 1, 2, 3 (most frequently it appears in Case 1, for ex-
ample: a = 4; d1 = 1; d2 = 1:33; d3 = 1:77; dN = 0:44; ¢ = 0:36). In
all these cases a new entrant is the most e±cient ¯rm in the market (dN is
the lowest among all ¯rms). Although in many industries it is di±cult to
imagine that a ¯rm, which is a newcomer to a market, could possess the most
advanced technology but there are cases where it could be true. There is a
tough competition to operate °ights from the Heathrow Airport in London.
Landing slots are the necessary assets to do business. Incumbents (British
Airways, United, and others) do not allow other airlines to buy or lease land-
ing slots at the airport in order to keep competitors away from a lucrative
Trans-Atlantic °ights business. However, it is possible that a low-cost car-
rier enters the market21 by buying divested assets and it is the most e±cient
player (e±cient enough to reduce the price in the market). Probably a new
e±cient entrant needs not much assets to start pro¯table business: if a new
entrant is e±cient, dN is small, then divesture ¢ could be small. At the
same time 'little' divesture keeps the merger pro¯table for the merging ¯rms.
In this case the results of the auction is bene¯cial for all parties involved:




9b(a ¡ 2 d3
1+¢ + 1
2¡¢)2 > 1
16b(a + 1 + d2 ¡ 3d3)2 = ¦
Before
3 .
21Here the de¯nition of the market is °ights from Heathrow.
17consumers, merging ¯rms, a new entrant, and the existing competitor (it is
more pro¯table for Firm 3 to stay away from the purchase of assets at the
auction).
Another situation is when a new entrant wins the auction and the price
decreases, but this new market structure is unpro¯table for the merging ¯rms.
It is possible in Cases 1, 2, 3, and 5 (most frequently it appears in Case 1,
for example: a = 4; d1 = 1; d2 = 1:2; d3 = 1:3; dN = 0:5;¢ 2 [0:80;1:00]).
In this situation we can use the same example of the Heathrow airport as
above with the only di®erence that the merging ¯rms would not allow the
divesture to a new entrant to happen. Appearance of a new more e±cient
competitor will decrease their future pro¯ts. Therefore the merging ¯rms
prefer to abandon the merger.
It is possible that if a new entrant wins the auction, the price would have
decreased and it would have been pro¯table for the merging ¯rms, however
the existing competitor bids higher price for the assets and a new market
structure either leads to higher prices or makes the merger unpro¯table for
the merging ¯rms.
The situation when it leads to higher prices can emerge in Cases 1, 2, 3, 5,
and 8 (most frequently it appears in Case 2, for example: a = 4;d1 = 1;d2 =
1:2; d3 = 0:9; dN = 0:8; ¢ = 0:6), i.e. when either a new entrant is the
most e±cient ¯rm or the merging ¯rms are the least e±cient ¯rms in the pre-
merger market (Firm 1 and 2 have the highest marginal costs). The existing
competitor does not allow the merger to happen simply by overbidding a
new entrant and causing the price to increase. As a result the agency rejects
the purchaser of divested assets and the merger, the merging ¯rms have to
abandon the merger and forgo expected pro¯ts in the future, and consumers
have to stay with the pre-merger price, which could have decreased due to
the merger.
The situation when divesture to the existing competitor makes the merger
unpro¯table can emerge in Cases 1, 3, 4, 6, 8, 9 (most frequently it appears
in Case 4, for example: a = 4;d1 = 1;d2 = 1:47; d3 = 1:68; dN = 1:26; ¢ =
0:79). As a result the merging ¯rms have to abandon the merger and forgo
expected pro¯ts in the future, and consumers have to stay with the pre-
18merger price, which could have decreased due to the merger with divesture
to a new entrant.
In both cases the agency (and consumers) would be better o® if a new entrant
wins the auction. Therefore, by excluding the existing competitor (incum-
bent) from the auction the agency can enhance consumer and merging ¯rms
welfare. Furthermore, this policy is easy to implement.
Whenever a new entrant has the highest marginal costs among all ¯rms (Case
10, 11, 12) and the assets are divested to him, the price will always increase
and the agency will reject the divesture and, consequently, the merger. The
intuition is that given the number of ¯rms in the market stays the same
(three) and convexity of the marginal costs function it is unreasonable to
divest assets from 'e±cient' to the least e±cient ¯rm because in the model
the market price depends on the sum of marginal costs across all ¯rms.
Under wide range of parameters the existing competitor wins the auction,
the price decreases, and such market structure is pro¯table for the merging
¯rms to proceed with the merger. However, the price could also increase in
some cases or a new market structure could be unpro¯table for the merging
¯rms. These results are similar to the ones discussed in the symmetric case.
5 Conclusion
The presented model introduces a simple theoretical framework to analyze
structural remedies in merger regulation. It captures all main issues that
are at stake in merger approval decisions: e±ciency defense and consumer
welfare, amount of divesture and auction design, viability of a new entrant
and rationalization of output between merging ¯rms.
Under the current merger guidelines the merging ¯rms can sell divested assets
through an auction, while a purchaser of the assets must be approved by the
agency. Evidently the merging ¯rms choose a purchaser, which is the most
pro¯table for them: based on revenue from the auction and future pro¯t
from a new market structure. The agency only checks whether the price will
19decrease or increase after the purchase and, respectively, approves or rejects
a purchaser and the merger.
The analysis of the symmetric case shows that divesture allows to extend
the range of parameters when a merger should be approved. While the
nonsymmetric case shows the importance of the rationalization of production
between the merging ¯rms and the viability of a new entrant.
From the results of the numerical analysis we can suggest to make the agency
more active in the selection of a potential purchaser of divested assets. The
agency can write down in the merger guidelines that ¯rst they want to look
for a new entrant (a viable one) and only if the one is not found then to
consider existing competitors. For some parameters the agency is better-o®
to exclude the existing competitor (incumbent) from the auction. As it was
shown in the paper it could lead to a more favorable outcome for consumers
and merging ¯rms.
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21Graph 0: Expected profits from buying assets:
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Graph 1: Required divesture (Delta,%)  for given 












































 MATLAB code for the situation when an existing competitor wins the auction but the price will 
increase. However, if a new entrant would have won the auction, the price would decrease and it 
would be profitable for the merging firms 
 









X1=0;  X2=0; X3=0; X4=0; X5=0; X6=0;     
X7=0;  X8=0; X9=0; X10=0; X11=0; X12=0;  
 
for i1=1:N 
  for i2=1:K 
   for i3=1:K  
    for i4=1:K 
 





 I1=(a-1-3*d2i+d3i)>0;        % without divesture the price will increase 
  
 I211=(a-3+d2i+d3i)>0;                       % positive output for Firm 1 before 
 I212=(a-3/(2-deltai)+d3i+dNi/deltai)>0;    % positive output for Firm 1 after with new entrant 
 I213=(a-3/(2-deltai)+d3i/(1+deltai))>0;    % positive output for Firm 1 after with existing competitor 
 I22=(a+1-3*d2i+d3i)>0;                       % positive output for Firm 2 before 
 I231=(a+1+d2i-3*d3i)>0;                      % positive output for Firm 3 before 
 I232=(a-3*d3i+1/(2-deltai)+dNi/deltai)>0;  % positive output for Firm 3 after with new entrant 
 I233=(a-3*d3i/(1+deltai)+1/(2-deltai))>0;  % positive output for Firm 3 after with existing competitor 
 I2N=(a-3*dNi/deltai+1/(2-deltai)+d3i)>0;   % positive output for the new entrant with Delta assets 
     




 % it is profitable for the merging firms 1 and 2 if a new entrant buys assets  
 I41=((a-3/(2-deltai)+d3i+dNi/deltai)^2-(a-3+d2i+d3i)^2-(a+1-3*d2i+d3i)^2)>0; 
  
 % it is profitable for the merging firms 1 and 2 if an existing competitor (EC) buys assets  
 I42=((16/9)*(a-2/(2-deltai)+d3i/(1+deltai))^2-(a-3+d2i+d3i)^2-(a+1-3*d2i+d3i)^2)>0; 
  
 % price NOT increases if a new entrant (N) buys assets 
 I51=(1+d2i-1/(2-deltai)-dNi/deltai)>0; 
  
 % price INCREASES if an existing competitor (EC) buys assets 
 I52=(a-3+4/(2-deltai)-3*d2i-3*d3i+4*d3i/(1+deltai))>0;  
  
     
 I=I1*I211*I212*I213*I22*I231*I232*I233*I2N*I3*I41*I42*I51*I52; 
 % if all conditions hold then it is 1, if at least one doesn’t then 0 
      Case1=(dNi<1)&(1<d2i)&(d2i<d3i);     % All possible ordered combinations d1,d2,d3,dN 
   Case2=(dNi<d3i)&(d3i<1)&(1<d2i);     % given that d2>d1=1 
   Case3=(dNi<1)&(1<d3i)&(d3i<d2i);  
   Case4=(1<dNi)&(dNi<d2i)&(d2i<d3i);  % If the conditions are satisfied then 1, otherwise 0 
   Case5=(d3i<dNi)&(dNi<1)&(1<d2i);  
   Case6=(1<dNi)&(dNi<d3i)&(d3i<d2i);  
   Case7=(1<d2i)&(d2i<dNi)&(dNi<d3i);  
   Case8=(d3i<1)&(1<dNi)&(dNi<d2i);  
   Case9=(1<d3i)&(d3i<dNi)&(dNi<d2i);   
   Case10=(1<d2i)&(d2i<d3i)&(d3i<dNi); 
   Case11=(d3i<1)&(1<d2i)&(d2i<dNi); 
   Case12=(1<d3i)&(d3i<d2i)&(d2i<dNi); 
  
if Case1*I==1  
    X1=X1+1;     % count number of situations that fall in Case 1 and satisfy inequalities in I 
elseif Case2*I==1  
    X2=X2+1; 
elseif Case3*I==1  
    X3=X3+1; 
elseif Case4*I==1  
    X4=X4+1; 
elseif Case5*I==1  
    X5=X5+1; 
elseif Case6*I==1  
    X6=X6+1; 
elseif Case7*I==1  
    X7=X7+1; 
elseif Case8*I==1  
    X8=X8+1; 
elseif Case9*I==1  
    X9=X9+1; 
elseif Case10*I==1  
    X10=X10+1; 
elseif Case11*I==1  
    X11=X11+1; 
elseif Case12*I==1  






end     
toc; 
 
X1   % Display total number of situations that satisfied Case 1 and all specified inequalities  
X2   % matters whether it is 0 or not 
X3 
X4 
X5  
X6 
X7 
X8 
X9 
X10 
X11 
X12 